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105 
JUSTICE BRANDEIS AND CIVIC DUTY IN A PLURALISTIC 
SOCIETY 
By Joel K. Goldstein*  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
History remembers Justice Louis D. Brandeis as a champion 
of individual rights.  Max Lerner, for instance, associated Brandeis 
with a “deeply felt individualism.”1  Alpheus Mason, who authored 
the first significant Brandeis biography titled Brandeis: A Free Man’s 
Life, concluded that, for Justice Brandeis, “[i]ndividual worth 
remained his favorite theme, human dignity his unvarying 
touchstone.”2  Philippa Strum, another prominent biographer, wrote, 
“individual liberty was the value [Brandeis] held highest.”3   
This association of Brandeis and rights is certainly not a 
misperception.  Few Americans have done more than Brandeis to 
articulate and establish widely cherished liberties.  The iconic 
Harvard Law Review article Brandeis co-authored in 18904 and his 
dissent in Olmstead v. United States5 established him as a creator of 
both common law and constitutional rights to privacy, the growth and 
influence of which have surely exceeded his expectations.  And his 
eloquent concurrence in Whitney v. California6 remains the classic 
judicial exposition of the freedom of speech and assembly.  These 
 
*Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  I am grateful 
to Charles A. Miller for helpful comments on this article, to Jordan Buchheit for his able 
research assistance, and to Stephanie Haley for administrative help.  Many thanks, too, to 
Samuel Levine for the invitation to participate in the Brandeis symposium at Touro Law 
School and to the other participants for such a rich and rewarding conference. 
1 Max Lerner, The Social Thought of Justice Brandeis, in MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 9, 12 
(Felix Frankfurter ed., 1932).  
2 ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 644 (1946). 
3 PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE, x (1984). 
4 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
5 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
6 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
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writings retain their instructive power, in judicial opinions and 
teaching materials.  They would have secured his legacy as a 
contributor to the development of individual rights if he had written 
nothing else on these subjects.  But he did.  
Yet the common focus on Brandeis as a vindicator of rights 
risks obscuring other defining aspects of his jurisprudential and 
philosophical outlook, aspects which speak even more urgently to the 
challenges America now faces a century after he joined the Court.  
Brandeis’ discussion of rights coexisted with his commitment to a 
demanding concept of civic duty.  He believed that living in civil 
society imposed obligations on citizens that went well beyond the 
basic duties to obey the law, pay taxes and vote.  He thought 
engagement an obligation of citizenship and knowledge an 
obligation, and a likely consequence, of engagement.  In contexts 
where modern liberals and conservatives celebrate various rights, 
Brandeis was likely to emphasize duties as well.  Rather than simply 
assuming the perspective of the individual and asking what 
government owed him or her, Brandeis also adopted society’s 
vantage point and considered what the individual owed the 
community. 
Brandeis’ conception of duty (and rights) coincided with and 
was linked to his recognition that America was a pluralistic 
community, and to his commitment to the ideal that America should 
be open to, respectful of, and welcoming of, diverse people.  The fact 
and value of pluralism may have made his acknowledgement of 
rights more important but it also compelled a robust conception of 
civic duty.  Brandeis saw communal engagement as a vehicle for 
individuals to broaden their knowledge and experience that, in turn, 
would better lead them to accept and appreciate others, minimize 
discord, and act as an instrument for individual and societal growth. 
 Brandeis’ commitment to a demanding ideal of civic duty in 
a pluralistic community was evident in his words, on and off the 
Court, and his call was made credible by its consistency and by its fit 
with the behavior of a lifetime.  Brandeis’ sense of duty in a 
pluralistic context was apparent in multiple facets of his life including 
his sense of professional responsibility as a lawyer, his activity as a 
public citizen, his engagement as a Zionist leader, and, ultimately, his 
work as a Supreme Court justice.  This essay shows how Brandeis’ 
commitment to civic duty in a pluralistic society appeared in these 
four areas. 
2
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II.  CIVIC DUTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 
A. In Law Practice 
 Brandeis’ conception of civic duty related to his sense of 
professional responsibility.  In 1905, he converted an invitation to 
speak to students at Harvard Law School about the “Ethics of the 
Legal Profession” into an occasion to expound on a lawyer’s duty to 
serve the public.7  He began by attributing to his listeners a 
predisposition for service. “[F]eeling the generous impulse for 
service which the University fosters, you wish to know whether the 
legal profession would afford you special opportunities for usefulness 
to your fellow-men, and, if so, what the obligations and limitations 
are which it imposes.”8  After Brandeis imputed to the Harvard Law 
students of 1905 a desire to be men for others,  he proceeded to 
reassure them that the legal profession offered “unusual opportunities 
for usefulness” in part because a lawyer’s “training”  prepared him 
for “the questions which are presented in a democracy.”9 
Brandeis criticized lawyers for promoting business interests 
rather than the public good. They had failed to advance “constructive 
legislation” necessary to vindicate the public interest regarding great 
societal problems and had failed to oppose proposals motivated by 
“selfish interests.”10  In fact, lawyers had often erred by advocating 
“as lawyers, legislative measures which as citizens they could not 
approve” and justifying their behavior by a “false analogy” to their 
role in litigation.11  Instead, lawyers should only support meritorious 
legislation.12  They had both an opportunity and a duty to participate 
in public affairs.  Future lawyers would find in their chosen 
profession “an opportunity for usefulness which is probably 
unequalled” since the legal profession was called “to do a great work 
for this country.”13 
As a lawyer, Brandeis practiced what he preached.  His sense 
of duty was evident in his professional activities before his 
 
7 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, 329 (1933). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 330-31. 
10 Id. at 339. 
11 Id. 
12 BRANDEIS, Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 7, at 339-
41. 
13 Id. at 343. 
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appointment to the Court when, in the words of Alexander Bickel, he 
“engaged in the private practice of the public profession of the 
law.”14  From at least the time he was in his mid-thirties until he 
joined the Court a quarter-century later, Brandeis devoted an 
extraordinary amount of time to public interest legal work.15  When 
Clarence Darrow, counsel to the United Mine Workers, asked 
Brandeis what his fee would be for the substantial work involved in 
representing Pennsylvania coal miners before a commission 
investigating their wage dispute, Brandeis replied that other than 
reimbursement of his expenses, his compensation would consist 
entirely of the “satisfaction of having aided a good cause.”16  
Brandeis repeatedly refused to bill a wealthy client for legal work he 
thought was in the public interest, telling him that he intended to 
spend 50 percent of his time in public service.17  He often reimbursed 
his partners for his time spent in pro bono matters to minimize the 
extent to which they subsidized his public-minded work.18  Although 
his early efforts centered on Boston and New England, during the 
decade before his appointment to the Court he was increasingly 
involved, often simultaneously, in demanding efforts that brought 
him national, even international attention.  In 1902, a massive coal 
strike in Pennsylvania brought Brandeis into a major national 
controversy involving labor unions.19  In November 1907, the 
National Consumers’ League engaged him to defend Oregon’s 
maximum hours statute for women employees.20  Brandeis marshaled 
an abundance of data which consumed all but a few pages of his 113-
page brief in Muller v. Oregon,21 to demonstrate that the Oregon 
statute fit within a loophole left open by Lochner v. New York22 
because the restriction on freedom of contract was a means to protect 
the health and safety of women workers.23  The fact-laden “Brandeis 
 
14 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT WORK v (1957). 
15 See generally David W. Levy, Brandeis, The Reformer, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 711 (2007). 
16 Quoted in MELVIN I. UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE 231 (2009). 
17 Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: Teacher, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 733, 738 (2007). 
18 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 354. 
19 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 230-33. 
20 MASON, supra note 2, at 248-52. 
21 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
22 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
23 The Brandeis Brief—in its Entirety, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS SCHOOL OF LAW LIBRARY, 
https://louisville.edu/law/library/special-collections/the-louis-d.-brandeis-collection/the-
brandeis-brief-in-its-entirety (last visited Nov. 17, 2016). 
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Brief” not only produced a unanimous decision upholding the statute, 
but also created a new legal instrument that civil rights attorneys later 
imitated.  In 1910, his representation of Collier’s Magazine before a 
Congressional committee in connection with the Pinchot-Ballinger 
conservation dispute also attracted national attention.24  Ultimately, 
Brandeis’ painstaking legal work produced revelations that impugned 
the integrity and conduct of President William Howard Taft and led 
to the resignation of Secretary of the Interior Richard Ballinger.25  
That summer, shortly after the previous assignment was completed, 
Brandeis became involved in the New York garment workers’ 
strike.26  By 1910, Brandeis’ public interest involvements made him 
“a household name.”27   
Brandeis’ legal training predisposed him to an inclusive 
outlook and he connected law and lawyers to pluralism.  Brandeis 
stated that law practice “tends to make the lawyer judicial in attitude 
and extremely tolerant.”28  The legal profession was premised on the 
belief that a dispute could not “be properly decided until both sides 
are heard.”29  Experience taught a lawyer “that nearly every question 
has two sides . . . .”30   
Brandeis worried that the limited exposure of many lawyers 
to other communities would minimize understanding.  In 1905, he 
warned an audience of Harvard law students that the lack of contact 
many of them had with working men left them ignorant of the 
working man’s thinking.31 
The prior year, Brandeis had displayed a commitment to 
industrial pluralism in a remarkable speech to his clients at the annual 
banquet of the Boston Typothetae.  Annual banquets are, of course, 
occasions for celebration and self-congratulation, this one particularly 
so because the printers had just prevailed in an industrial struggle 
with the printers union, in part owing to Brandeis’ work as their 
counsel.  In his address, Brandeis briefly reviewed the facts of the 
 
24 See MASON, supra note 2, at 254-82. 
25 See UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 254-74. 
26 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 243-53. 
27 LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS 161 (1983). 
28 BRANDEIS, Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 7, at 333. 
29 BRANDEIS, Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 7, at 333. 
30 BRANDEIS, Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 7, at 333. 
31 BRANDEIS, Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 7, at 329 
n.1, 342. 
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dispute and congratulated his clients on their victory.32  He then 
proceeded to devote most of his remarks to explaining why industrial 
democracy was necessary for the well-being of their businesses, why 
they should recognize and respect unions and negotiate with union 
leaders, and how they should go about it.33  When a controversy 
developed, Brandeis instructed his employer-clients that 
“[e]mployers and employees should try to agree.”34  Rather than 
persist in the common entrepreneurial response that the business 
owner was entitled to dictate its own conduct, Brandeis, who 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt later aptly nicknamed Isaiah, 
implored his clients to adopt the “spirit” of “[c]ome, let us reason 
together.”35  Employers should view their employees as partners.36  
Brandeis believed that industrial dialogue could avoid or resolve 
most disputes.  He said: 
      Nine-tenths of the serious controversies which 
arise in life result from misunderstanding, result from 
one man not knowing the facts which to the other man 
seem important, or otherwise failing to appreciate his 
point of view.  A properly conducted conference 
involves a frank disclosure of such facts—patient, 
careful argument, willingness to listen and to consider. 
37 
Owners and “the real managers” should participate in these 
conferences, time-consuming though they are, to maximize the 
chances of resolution.38  While employers should resist illegal or 
immoral demands, they should approach labor based on “the eternal 
 
32 BRANDEIS, The Employer and Trade Unions, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 
7, at 13-15. 
33 BRANDEIS, The Employer and Trade Unions, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 
7, at 15-21. 
34 BRANDEIS, The Employer and Trade Unions, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 
7, at 21. 
35 BRANDEIS, The Employer and Trade Unions, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 
7, at 22. 
36 BRANDEIS, The Employer and Trade Unions, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 
7, at 22. 
37 BRANDEIS, The Employer and Trade Unions, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 
7, at 21. 
38 BRANDEIS, The Employer and Trade Unions, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 
7, at 22-23. 
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss1/7
2017 CIVIC DUTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 111 
principles of Liberty, Fraternity, Justice, [and] Honor.”39  Brandeis’ 
belief in the efficacy of reasoned discourse in the industrial setting 
foreshadowed his approach a quarter century later when, as a justice, 
he considered free speech rights of dissidents and encouraged 
majorities to go to lengths to engage adversaries rather than silence 
them.40 
Shortly before his nomination to the Court, Brandeis lamented 
specialization in legal practice because it narrowed the exposure of 
most lawyers to a diversified clientele.41  Moreover, and perhaps 
more importantly, in the past most able lawyers participated in civic 
affairs but now their practices discouraged such activity “and thus the 
broadening of view which comes from political life was lost.”42 
B. As a Public Citizen 
Brandeis’ conception of civic duty was even more evident in 
his conduct as a public citizen and his discussions about citizenship.  
As a close friend of leading progressive Senator Robert La Follette, 
he helped draft, and testified for several days before congressional 
committees in favor of, legislation to amend the Sherman Act to 
mitigate some of the consequences from the Supreme Court’s 
decision43 in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States44 and 
actively supported La Follette’s candidacy for the Republican 
presidential nomination in 1912.45  Following Woodrow Wilson’s 
nomination as the Democratic presidential candidate that year, 
Brandeis became an important adviser to him, financial supporter, 
and surrogate who spoke around the country on his behalf.46  
Although Brandeis was passed over for Wilson’s cabinet, he 
remained a close adviser to Wilson on banking regulation, antitrust, 
and other matters.47 
 
39 BRANDEIS, The Employer and Trade Unions, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 
7, at 24, 26-27. 
40 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334, 336-39, 343 (1920) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372, 375-78 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
41 BRANDEIS, The Living Law, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 7, at 360. 
42 BRANDEIS, The Living Law, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION, supra note 7, at 360-61. 
43 PAPER, supra note 27, at 168-72. 
44 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
45 PAPER, supra note 27, at 172-74. 
46 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 343-52. 
47 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 380-97. 
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Paul A. Freund, Brandeis’ former law clerk, wrote that to 
Brandeis “[t]he opportunity to serve was also an obligation.”48  When 
Brandeis’ former law clerks suggested a gathering to honor his 80th 
birthday, he asked that instead each write to him regarding the public 
service they were performing.49  They did a lot.50  Brandeis did not 
think past performance or current exigencies discharged someone 
from a continuing duty of public service.  His demanding creed 
perhaps explained his reaction when a friend suggested that Al Smith, 
the former governor of New York and 1928 Democratic presidential 
candidate, might be excused from further public service due to 
financial hardships, age, illness, and lengthy prior service, unless one 
believed a man had an eternal duty to his community.  Brandeis 
focused on the last thought and replied, “Isn’t that the answer?”51  For 
Brandeis it was.  He joined the Court in his 60th year and continued to 
discharge the Court’s work for nearly 23 years, retiring only after his 
health began to slip and about two-and-one-half years before his 
death.52  Even so, he continued his involvement with Zionism and his 
engagement in public affairs until his death.53 
Brandeis certainly thought that those to whom the most had 
been given had the greatest obligation to serve,54 but his ambitious 
vision of citizenship included a much more democratic view of public 
service.  His conception of duty was not confined, as Justice William 
O. Douglas implied, to “those whose training and competence 
 
48 PAUL A. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 131 (1968). 
49 Paul A. Freund, Mr. Justice Brandeis, 55 HARV. L. REV. 195, 195 (1941). 
50 Brandeis’ law clerks included  Secretary of State Dean Acheson; Judge Calvert 
Magruder of the United States  Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; Judge Henry Friendly 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; James M. Landis, former Dean 
of Harvard Law School and Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission; William 
G. Claytor, Jr., Secretary of the Navy and Deputy Secretary of Defense; Harry Shulman, a 
professor and dean at Yale Law School; and Paul A. Freund, a professor at Harvard Law 
School who served two stints in the office of the Solicitor General). 
51 FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 48, at 131-32. 
52 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 436, 458, 748-49, 752-53. 
53 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 751. 
54 Louis D. Brandeis, Address before New Century Club on the Occasion of the 250th 
Anniversary of the Settlement of the Jews in the United States: What Loyalty Demands 
(Nov. 28, 1905) (transcript available in the Louis D. Brandeis School of Law Library) 
[hereinafter Louis D. Brandeis, What Loyalty Demands] (“Of him who has most in ability 
and intelligence, most is required, as the rich should contribute most in money to the expense 
of government.  Few have the privilege or the burden of serving the State in an elective or an 
appointive office[.]”). 
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permitted to assume an active civic role.”55  Rather, Brandeis thought 
of political participation as an obligation of citizenship more 
generally.  In 1904 he proclaimed that the people could only govern 
“by taking the trouble to inform themselves as to the facts necessary 
for a correct decision, and then by recording that decision through a 
public vote.”56  He scoffed at those who criticized politicians but 
refused to participate because “politicians, even if their motives are 
not of the purest, come much nearer performing their duties as 
citizens than the so-called ‘good’ citizens who stay at home.”57   
The following year, Brandeis argued that “active participation 
in government” was a test of a citizen’s loyalty.58  Although all could 
not hold public office, citizens had both “the right and the obligation 
to vote.”59  Voters were part of government and were “our country’s 
rulers.”60  Voting was “essential to the welfare of the State” but 
because it imposed duties that “are difficult and exacting” was “not 
simple.”61  And just performing the not-so-simple act of voting, a 
duty 40 percent neglected, was not alone sufficient.  Men had to vote 
“right.”62  To do so required voters to seek “accurate information” 
and make appropriate judgments “about men and measures.”63  
Brandeis thought it an abuse for a citizen to vote based on personal 
self-interest rather than on the public good.  Above all, voters “should 
recognize the seriousness of this office of citizen, the seriousness of 
 
55 Hon. William O. Douglas, The Lasting Influence of Mr. Justice Brandeis, 19 TEMPLE 
L.Q. 361, 361 (1946). 
56 Louis D. Brandeis, Speech Before the Public School Association (Dec. 2, 1904) 
(transcript available in the Louis D. Brandeis School of Law Library) [hereinafter Louis D. 
Brandeis, Speech Before the Public School Association]. 
57 Id. 
58 Louis D. Brandeis, What Loyalty Demands, supra note 54. See also Strum, Brandeis: 
The Public Activist and Freedom of Speech, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 659, 704 (2007) (stating that 
Brandeis expected citizens “above all, to participate actively in their democracy.”); 
UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 747 (“The highest honor in a democracy is to 
be a citizen, but it carries the responsibility to participate in the governing process.”); 
Douglas, supra note 55, at 361 (stating that “Brandeis had a deep conviction that citizenship 
in a democracy carried responsibilities more extensive than the conventional duty to vote 
and to pay taxes.  He perceived that it was not only necessary for those who exercised the 
franchise to have an intelligent grasp of the issues of government.  He was convinced that it 
was the bounden duty of those whose training and competence permitted to assume an active 
civic role in getting at the heart of the issues and in carrying those issues to the public.”). 
59 Louis D. Brandeis, What Loyalty Demands, supra note 54. 
60 Louis D. Brandeis, What Loyalty Demands, supra note 54. 
61 Louis D. Brandeis, What Loyalty Demands, supra note 54. 
62 Louis D. Brandeis, What Loyalty Demands, supra note 54. 
63 Louis D. Brandeis, What Loyalty Demands, supra note 54. 
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the vote which is its expression” and must treat it “as a sacred trust to 
be exercised for the common good, and that he who selfishly omits to 
cast it, as he who casts it selfishly – is disloyal.”64  Democracy, 
Brandeis wrote in a letter in 1922, “is a serious undertaking. . . . It 
demands continuous sacrifice by the individual and more exigent 
obedience to the moral law than any other form of government.”65  
As Jeffrey Rosen rightly points out, Brandeis rejected the idea of 
some progressives that experts could govern the people with little 
intrusion on the time of non-elites.  On the contrary, Brandeis 
“believed passionately that citizens have a duty to educate themselves 
so that they are capable of self-government, both personal and 
political, and of defending their liberties against overreaching 
corporate and federal power.”66  
Brandeis conceived “every voter [a]s a part ruler of the 
state.”67  Democracy depended on an educated and engaged citizenry.  
The state, therefore, was obliged to provide citizens with facilities for 
development, the opportunity for their use, and must stimulate the 
desire to use those facilities.68  That imposed a requirement to 
consider the well-being of others.  In a democracy, Brandeis 
concluded, citizens were “necessarily our brothers’ keepers.”69  In 
order to discharge their function as citizens, individuals must have an 
appropriate income, reasonable working hours, education, 
independence, and leisure.70  Society must make sure that these 
conditions existed so that all could function as democratic citizens.71   
Leisure was a critical resource for democratic citizens but, to 
Brandeis, leisure was certainly not “idleness”72 or reading a thriller at 
 
64 Louis D. Brandeis, What Loyalty Demands, supra note 54; see also UROFSKY, 
BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 401 (discussing Brandeis’ belief that the office of citizen 
was the highest office in a democracy and required considerable effort to fulfill its 
responsibilities). 
65 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Robert W. Bruere (Feb. 25, 1922), in V LETTERS OF 
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, 1921-1941: ELDER STATESMAN, 45, 46 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. 
Levy eds., 1978) [hereinafter V LETTERS]. 
66 JEFFREY ROSEN, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: AMERICAN PROPHET 17 (2016). 
67 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM: A COLLECTION OF 
ADDRESSES AND STATEMENTS BY LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 3, 5 (1942) [hereinafter True 
Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM].   
68 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 5. 
69 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 5. 
70 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 6-7. 
71 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 6-7. 
72 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 6-7. 
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the beach.  After all, Brandeis found relaxation by reading a favorite 
book, Alfred Zimmern’s Greek Commonwealth, repeatedly for 
pleasure even when he was immersed in stressful litigation.73  Rather, 
leisure, he said, “means ability to work not less but more, ability to 
work at something besides breadwinning, ability to work harder 
while working at breadwinning, and ability to work more years at 
breadwinning.”74  Leisure would allow citizens to develop the 
knowledge that was a prerequisite for skillful civic participation and 
afford them the opportunity to so engage.75  Democracy depended on 
such leisure.76 
Brandeis supported women’s suffrage not simply as a right 
but as a duty.  He recognized and as a good advocate made, both 
arguments for granting women the vote.  He concluded, “[t]hat 
women should enjoy this right and perform this duty is essential to 
the success of democracy.”77  But ultimately he thought the more 
compelling justification for women’s suffrage was the “need of the 
state.”78  Women could only fully develop “through the assumption 
of broad responsibilities.”79  They needed the vote primarily so they 
could give to, not get from, society.  Moreover, since each group 
could best protect its own interests, democracy was at risk when any 
failed to participate.80  Women, thought this father of two 
professional women, could best protect themselves as democratic 
participants. 
Brandeis also believed that the society in which a citizen was 
obligated to participate was and should be pluralistic.  A year before 
joining the Court, Brandeis became the first Jewish American invited 
to deliver the Independence Day address at Boston’s Faneuil Hall.81  
In the speech, Brandeis reaffirmed his belief that pluralism was both 
a constitutional principle and a source of strength.  Modern men 
shared the founders’ belief “that in America, under a free 
 
73 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 295-97, 359. 
74 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 6-7. 
75 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 6-7. 
76 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 6-7. 
77 Louis D. Brandeis, Speech on Suffrage at the Tremont Temple (Oct. 12, 1915) 
(transcript available in the Louis D. Brandeis School of Law Library) [hereinafter Louis D. 




81 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 413. 
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government, many peoples would make one nation.”82  America had 
welcomed to citizenship immigrants from many countries in the 
belief that such a policy could “best serve ourselves and mankind.  
This faith has been justified.”83 
Although Brandeis thought other nations could match 
America’s commitment to individual autonomy and liberty, he 
recalled that one “peculiarly American” feature is “inclusive 
brotherhood.”84  Brandeis imagined the democratic state as an 
“inclusive brotherhood,” which rested on the twin “pillars” that all 
were equally entitled to liberty and that “equal opportunity will most 
advance civilization.”85  
Moreover, Brandeis thought America had and should 
welcome immigrants from different lands and celebrate their 
diversity, not insist on conformity.  
America has believed that each race had something of 
peculiar value which it can contribute to the 
attainment of those high ideals for which it is striving.  
America has believed that we must not only give to 
the immigrant the best that we have, but must preserve 
for America the good that is in the immigrant and 
develop in him the best of which he is capable.  
America has believed that in differentiation, not in 
uniformity, lies the path of progress.86  
Far from seeking to extinguish national differences, Brandeis 
believed they provided strength.  America believed that every people, 
“has the right and duty to develop, and that only through such 
differentiated development will high civilization be attained.”87  In 
Brandeis’ formulation, individuals and the racial and ethnic groups 
with which they identified had a duty as well as a right “to develop” 
and that “differentiated development” constituted a public good. 
Brandeis believed that prejudice remained in liberal society 
because of the failure to grant “the equality of whole peoples or 
 
82 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 3. 
83 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 3. 
84 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 8. 
85 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 8-9. 
86 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 10. 
87 BRANDEIS, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 11. 
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nationalities” as well as of individuals.88  Democracy was predicated 
on the belief that “the full development of each individual is not only 
a right, but a duty to society; and that our best hope for civilization 
lies not in uniformity, but in wide differentiation.”89  Inclusion was a 
right but it implied a duty to participate to fully develop and 
accordingly redeem society’s faith and investment in each individual. 
C. The Influence of Brandeis’ Zionism on His Views 
These ideas were consistent with, and probably traced in part 
to, Brandeis’ involvement in the Zionist movement, a commitment 
which allowed him to develop his views about civic duty and its 
relationship to pluralistic society.  In his activities as a Zionist leader, 
Brandeis was committed to mobilizing American Jews to accept a 
communal responsibility to support the quest for a national homeland 
that would provide a refuge from anti-Semitism in Europe and 
elsewhere.  Yet he also had to address the suggestions that support 
for Zionism was inconsistent with loyalty to America.   
Brandeis made occasional speeches in support of the Zionist 
movement in the early months of the Wilson administration before 
becoming its American leader in August 1914 after World War I 
began.  These reflected a duty Jews had to advance Jewish communal 
interests.  For instance, in May of 1913 Brandeis told a Young Men’s 
Hebrew Association meeting in Chelsea, Massachusetts, of his 
conversation with the great Zionist, Aaron Aaronsohn, who had 
attributed the lack of crime among Jews in Palestine to their sense of 
mutual communal responsibility.90  This anecdote confirmed 
Brandeis’ belief that a sense of duty encouraged good citizenship in 
multiple ways.91  He told his audience that they must each feel 
themselves “the trustee of what is best in Jewish History” and let the 
example of the “pioneers in Palestine . . . radiate” their lives and 
commit to support their efforts.92  Indeed, he assumed leadership of 
the American Zionist movement because he deemed it his “duty” to 
 
88 BRANDEIS, The Jewish Problem, How to Solve It, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 
67, at 17. 
89 BRANDEIS, The Jewish Problem, How to Solve It, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 
67, at 19. 
90 BRANDEIS, To Be a Jew, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 39, 40-41 
[hereinafter To Be a Jew, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM]. 
91 BRANDEIS, To Be a Jew, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 40-41. 
92 BRANDEIS, To Be a Jew, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 41. 
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help and thought there was a collective “duty” to save the Jewish 
people.93 
Brandeis’ call for American Jews to actively support the 
Zionist movement ran counter to suggestions, in some Jewish and 
non-Jewish circles, of dual loyalty.  Brandeis confronted the issue 
and repudiated the premise that Jews could not be both loyal 
Americans and Zionists.  He associated American “ideals of 
democracy and of social justice” with venerable Jewish teachings .94   
He insisted, “loyalty to America demands rather that each American 
Jew become a Zionist.  For only through the ennobling effect of its 
strivings can we develop the best that is in us and give to this country 
the full benefit of our great inheritance.”95  Brandeis insisted that 
American Jews had a duty to lead the Zionist movement and that that 
effort would allow them to develop their own skills, which they could 
contribute to America. 
Brandeis called on every adult Jew, women and men to join 
the Zionist organization.96  Women would have equal rights but 
“[e]qual rights spell equal obligations.”97  In Chicago on January 2, 
1916, Brandeis told the Knights of Zion that their “duty as Jews” 
required them to elevate the Jewish people so it could “best serve 
America and the world.”  And he concluded, “Let no one of you, if 
he be a true American, shirk his duty.”98  In July, 1916, one month 
after joining the Court, Brandeis associated Zionism with democracy 
and said that “[d]emocracy means not merely, . . . the rights of the 
whole people, as the duties of the whole people.”99  Jews had not 
simply “a right to be heard” but “he has also a duty to be heard.”100  
Every Zionist had a duty to read at least one Zionist newspaper daily, 
 
93 BRANDEIS, The Jewish People Should Be Preserved, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra 
note 67, at 43-44; see also BRANDEIS, Strain Every Nerve, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra 
note 67, at 46-48. 
94 Louis D. Brandeis, A Call to the Educated Jew, 1 MENORAH J. 13, 15 (1915). 
95 BRANDEIS, The Jewish Problem, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 29; see 
also BRANDEIS, The Fruits of Zionism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 49-50. 
96 BRANDEIS, Every Jew a Zionist, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 76, 77 
[hereinafter Every Jew a Zionist, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM]. 
97 BRANDEIS, Every Jew a Zionist, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 76, 77  
98 BRANDEIS, Not by Charity Alone, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, at 84, 88. 
99 BRANDEIS, Democracy Means Responsibility, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, 
at 91 [hereinafter Democracy Means Responsibility, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM]. 
100 BRANDEIS, Democracy Means Responsibility, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, 
at 91. 
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to master its facts and to communicate what he read.101  A Zionist did 
not do his duty unless he joined a Zionist organization and saw that 
his siblings did Zionist work.102 
Brandeis expressed confidence that American Jews would 
“perform fully their obligation” to support Zionism.  There were 
“special reasons” they should be “eager to do so” since a Jewish State 
would do more for American Jews than they could do for it by 
enabling American Jews “to perform our plain duty to America.”  A 
Jewish State would help American Jews contribute “toward the 
attainment of the American ideals of democracy and social 
justice.”103  Supporting Zionism was a Jewish and American 
“duty.”104 
In arguing for the consistency of Americanism and Jewish 
experience, Brandeis also revealed his fundamental premises 
regarding life in democratic society.  For Jews, Brandeis argued, 
democracy was not simply an abstraction but a reality due to the 
existence of certain necessary conditions including “[a]n all-
pervading sense of duty in the citizen.”105  “Democratic ideals cannot 
be attained through emphasis merely upon the rights of man,” 
Brandeis wrote in 1915.  “Even a recognition that every right has a 
correlative duty will not meet the needs of democracy.  Duty must be 
accepted as the dominant conception in life.”106  After identifying 
other conditions essential to democracy, namely “high intellectual 
attainments” and “[s]ubmission to leadership,” rather than to 
authority, Brandeis returned to the theme of duty, which rested upon 
“[a] developed community sense.”107  Jews could not be described as 
individualists because “to a rare degree” they had “merged” their 
individuality and community interest, a condition evident in their 
interest in identifying themselves with the larger community rather 
 
101 BRANDEIS, Democracy Means Responsibility, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, 
at 92. 
102 BRANDEIS, Democracy Means Responsibility, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 67, 
at 93. 
103 BRANDEIS, The Fruits of Zionism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 88, at 54. 
104 BRANDEIS, Dreams May Be Made Into Realities, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM, supra note 
88, at 71, 72. 
105 BRANDEIS, A Call to the Educated Jew, supra note 94, at 15. 
106 BRANDEIS, A Call to the Educated Jew, supra note 94, at 15. 
107 BRANDEIS, A Call to the Educated Jew, supra note 94, at 16. 
15
Goldstein: Civic Duty in a Pluralistic Society
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
120 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
than focusing on an individual’s life as a prelude to a personal 
afterlife.108 
D. Justice Brandeis 
Once Brandeis was confirmed as a justice in June of 1916, 
except for an occasional speech to Zionist organizations, he 
essentially limited his public written discussions to his judicial 
opinions.  Unlike many modern justices, he did not write books or 
law review articles about the Court or constitutional theory nor did he 
sit for published interviews.  Yet his judicial writings continued to 
reveal the importance he gave to the ideals of civil duty and 
American pluralism. 
At times he went out of his way to introduce the ideal of civic 
duty into contexts where it was not otherwise under discussion.  For 
instance, in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,109 Brandeis 
dissented from the majority opinion holding a secondary boycott 
violated federal statutory law.110  Although he concluded that the 
union was within its rights, Brandeis went out of his way to recognize 
community obligation as paramount to individual rights.  “All rights 
are derived from the purposes of the society in which they exist; 
above all rights rises duty to the community,” he wrote.  “The 
conditions developed in industry may be such that those engaged in it 
cannot continue their struggle without danger to the community.”111 
Similarly, Brandeis’ commitment to duties as well as rights 
was evident in discussions of rights to private property.  In 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,112  he dissented from the majority 
opinion, which held a state statute unconstitutional because it 
prohibited the mining of coal beneath the surface of property to 
protect against subsidence.113  Brandeis rejected the suggestion that 
the doctrine of reciprocity of advantage precluded government from 
exercising police power to protect the public “from detriment and 
danger.”114  Those the statute hurt enjoyed “the advantage of living 
 
108 BRANDEIS, A Call to the Educated Jew, supra note 94, at 16-17. 
109 254 U.S. 443 (1921). 
110 Id. at 478-79. 
111 Id. at 488 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
112 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
113 Id. at 416. 
114 Id. at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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and doing business in a civilized community”115 thereby constituting 
whatever reciprocity of advantage they were owed.116  Brandeis, 
unlike his colleagues, refused to consider the owner’s rights to 
private property independent of the obligations associated with the 
privileges of social living. 
To be sure, Brandeis’ classic opinions in Whitney v. 
California and Olmstead v. United States in consecutive years in the 
late 1920s, represent two of the greatest statements of individual 
rights in American literature.117  Yet the former really represents a 
synthesis of his views regarding civic duty in a pluralistic society and 
the latter can easily be seen as related to those concerns, although the 
connection is less obvious. 
Brandeis’ Whitney concurrence was the culmination of years 
of thought and judicial writing about free speech.  In 1920 in Pierce 
v. United States,118  he had written that the  “fundamental right of free 
men to strive for better conditions through new legislation and new 
institutions” would be imperiled “if efforts to secure it by argument 
to fellow citizens” was treated as criminal incitement.119  Later that 
year he characterized political speech as not simply a political right 
but an obligation of citizenship.  He wrote: 
The right of a citizen of the United States to take part, 
for his own or the country’s benefit, in the making of 
federal laws and in the conduct of the government, 
necessarily includes the right to speak or write about 
them; to endeavor to make his own opinion 
concerning laws existing or contemplated prevail; and, 
to this end, to teach the truth as he sees it.  Were this 
not so, ‘the right of the people to assemble for the 
purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of 
 
115 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
116 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
117 See, e.g., UROFSKY, BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 16, at 618 (“Yet if he had never 
written anything other than the Olmstead and Whitney opinions, his impact on American 
constitutional law would still have been great.”); Id. at 641 (referring to Brandeis’ 
“towering” Whitney opinion which has “informed all discussions of free speech since.”); 
Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion 
in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 668 (1988) (stating that “the idealism 
that permeates his Whitney opinion . . . makes it arguably the most important essay ever 
written, on or off the bench, on the meaning of the first amendment.”). 
118 252 U.S. 239 (1920).  
119 Id. at 273 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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grievance or for anything else connected with the 
powers or duties of the national government’ would be 
a right totally without substance.  Full and free 
exercise of this right by the citizen is ordinarily also 
his duty; for its exercise is more important to the 
nation than it is to himself.  Like the course of the 
heavenly bodies, harmony in national life is a resultant 
of the struggle between contending forces.  In frank 
expression of conflicting opinion lies the greatest 
promise of wisdom in governmental action; and in 
suppression lies ordinarily the greatest peril.120  
In essence, Brandeis conceived of the right to free speech and 
assembly as essential to democracy.  The “[f]ull and free exercise of 
this right by the citizen is ordinarily also his duty,” Brandeis 
proclaimed in the quoted passage, because “its exercise is more 
important to the nation than it is to himself.”  He gave two reasons 
for his conclusion regarding the public importance of performance of 
the duty.  First, public exchange was an essential instrument of 
national “harmony.”  Exchange was more likely than avoidance to 
produce understanding.  Second, “frank expression of conflicting 
opinion” was most likely to produce wise government behavior.  By 
contrast, suppression of speech is perilous. 
Whitney involved an appeal from the conviction of Anita 
Whitney for helping to organize, belonging to and associating with 
the Communist Party of California, which was formed to teach 
criminal syndicalism.121  Brandeis used his opinion to suggest criteria 
which narrowed the “clear and present danger” test by his celebrated 
declaration of the centrality of liberty.122  “To reach sound 
conclusions on these matters,” Brandeis wrote, required considering 
“why a state is, ordinarily, denied the power to prohibit dissemination 
of social, economic and political doctrine which a vast majority of its 
citizens believe to be false and fraught with evil consequence.”123  He 
wrote: 
 
120 Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 337-38 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
121 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 359-60. 
122 Id. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
123 Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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Those who won our independence believed that the 
final end of the state was to make men free to develop 
their faculties, and that in its government the 
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.  
They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.  
They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and 
courage to be the secret of liberty.  They believed that 
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think 
are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of 
political truth; that without free speech and assembly 
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion 
affords ordinarily adequate protection against the 
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest 
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public 
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a 
fundamental principle of the American government.124 
Brandeis’ connection of speech with the discovery of political 
truth and the repression of “noxious doctrine” implied that he 
regarded political participation as a duty of citizenship in a 
democratic society.125  How else was a society to make certain that 
“political truth” triumphed over “noxious doctrine” than through the 
active engagement of its citizenry?  And how else could democratic 
society combat “the greatest menace to freedom[,] . . . an inert 
people?”  Yet Brandeis did not leave that association merely to 
inference.  On the contrary, he made the point explicit, writing that 
“public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a 
fundamental principle of the American government.”  Whereas fear 
bred repression and hate, Brandeis argued that “the path of safety lies 
in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and 
proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is 
good ones.”126  The founding generation believed “in the power of 
reason as applied through public discussion” and recognized that 
majorities could be tyrannical and accordingly, guaranteed free 
speech and assembly as an antidote.127 
 
124 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
125 See Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: Teacher, supra note 17, at 747 (“Free speech is 
necessary not just as an individual right, but as the bedrock of democratic government.”). 
126 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
127 Id. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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To be sure, Brandeis thought that speech promoted individual 
development.  In Whitney, Brandeis stated that “[i]t is the function of 
speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears.”128  Yet the 
context of that statement makes clear that Brandeis’ concern was 
collective tyranny, not individual ignorance, and the remedy was 
discussion as a vehicle for social exchange not as a means of 
individual discovery.   
In other words, a “fundamental principle” of American 
government should recognize that “public discussion is a political 
duty.”  People had a “duty” to discuss issues publicly because 
political engagement protected freedom.  It helped produce truth; it 
checked majority tyranny; it protected minorities from oppression; 
and it produced an engaged populace with the “personal qualities of 
wisdom, creativity, and confidence” to resist noxious doctrine.129  
Brandeis believed that “the fully developed human would have a 
profound sense of responsibility to the community.”130 
Brandeis sought to protect, indeed encourage, robust political 
speech, including speech from society’s dissenters.  As such, 
Brandeis’ Whitney concurrence implicitly seeks to foster a pluralistic 
society.  Those who express orthodox thoughts are not in jeopardy of 
having their voices silenced.  The capacious free speech Brandeis 
championed was designed to prevent oppression of minorities.  
Daniel Farber wrote that Brandeis’ goal was “to produce a vibrant 
and creative intellectual community, and one genuinely open to full 
participation by all groups within society.”131  Brandeis believed in 
“popular participation in the governmental process as the path to a 
free and stable society, and public deliberation as a critical 
component of that participation.”132  Inasmuch as the people were the 
rulers in a democracy, they also had a duty to discharge their 
responsibility. 
 
128 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
129 See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 117, at 674 (“To me, his point is that noxious doctrine is 
most likely to flourish when its opponents lack the personal qualities of wisdom, creativity, 
and confidence.”). 
130 Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First 
Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 185 (1995). 
131 Id. at 190. 
132 Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, The Story of Whitney v. California: The Power of Ideas, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 383, 403 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d. ed. 2009) [hereinafter 
Bhagwat, The Story of Whitney v. California, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES]. 
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Brandeis envisioned an interactive society.  He thought 
participation and exchange would make majorities more pluralistic.  
“Men feared witches and burnt women,” he wrote in one of the most 
memorable passages.133  Brandeis’ remedy of public discussion rests 
on the faith that reason and interaction would have saved such a 
community from such a blunder.  In some instances, exchange would 
have produced converts in the direction reason led.  It at least would 
have promoted mutual understanding.  Interaction would have led the 
witch-fearing men to recognize their misperception before they acted 
upon it.  And discussion would have increased the likelihood that 
dissenters would believe the system heard their voices.  An impulse 
which, before his appointment to the Court, had led Brandeis to 
advocate industrial democracy, now led Justice Brandeis to prescribe 
interaction and exchange in political society. 
Brandeis celebrated the revolutionary generation who, not 
only, “did not fear political change,” as he said, but accomplished 
it.134  He stated:  
      Those who won our independence by revolution 
were not cowards.  They did not fear political change.  
They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty.  To 
courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the 
power of free and fearless reasoning applied through 
the processes of popular government, no danger 
flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, 
unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so 
imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity 
for full discussion.135 
 Diversity imposed more risk than did a homogeneous society.  It 
required more courage to hear one’s cherished views denounced and 
more ingenuity to meet those challenges by better reasoning.  
Brandeis envisioned a community of “courageous, self-reliant men, 
with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied 
through the processes of popular government.”  He believed, as 
Vincent Blasi has written, that “in a political community personal 
qualities, such as hope and imagination tend to be contagious and 
 
133 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376. (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
134 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
135 Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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reciprocal.”136  Brandeis was not naïve nor did he attribute 
superhuman powers to men.  On the contrary, a few years after his 
concurrence in Whitney he wrote that “[m]an is weak, and his 
judgment is at best fallible.”137  Yet reason was the alternative to 
repression, and therefore democratic society depended on creating 
conditions hospitable to it.  Thus, free speech was necessary to make 
democracy possible.138 
Democratic government existed in part to enable individuals 
to fully develop their abilities so they could function effectively as 
democratic citizens.139  Brandeis wrote in 1922 that “[t]he great 
developer is responsibility.”140  Citizens needed to participate in “the 
processes of common living” to develop their full potential.141  
Brandeis, of course, was an architect of a common law and 
constitutional right to privacy.  The former traced to his 1890 article 
in the Harvard Law Review.142  The year after Brandeis published his 
concurrence in Whitney, he dissented in Olmstead from Chief Justice 
Taft’s majority opinion that upheld a prosecution based on massive 
wire-tapping.  Brandeis invoked the right to privacy which was 
implicit in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.143  
Brandeis wrote that:  
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure 
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They 
recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, 
of his feelings, and of his intellect. They knew that 
only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of 
 
136 Blasi, supra note 117, at 676. 
137 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
138 Farber, supra note 130, at 183 (stating Brandeis believed that without free speech 
democracy was not “viable”); see also David E. Bernstein, From Progressivism to Modern 
Liberalism: Louis D. Brandeis as a Transitional Figure in Constitutional Law, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 2029, 2049 (2014) (“Brandeis defended freedom of speech primarily on the 
instrumental ground that it promoted free and rational public discussion, essential for the 
American people to govern themselves.”); Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, 
Privacy, and Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1323 (2010) (explaining Brandeis advocated 
free speech not simply as right “but because it safeguarded the social processes of self-
governance.”). 
139 Farber, supra note 130, at 184-85. 
140 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Robert W. Bruere, in V LETTERS, supra note 65, at 
46. 
141 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Robert W. Bruere, in V LETTERS, supra note 65, at 
46. 
142 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4. 
143 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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life are to be found in material things. They sought to 
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their 
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as 
against the government, the right to be let alone - the 
most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men.  To protect that right, every 
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the 
privacy of the individual, whatever the means 
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.144 
Brandeis’ identification with the right to privacy and “the 
right to be let alone” may seem inconsistent with a commitment to 
civic duty in a pluralistic society.  As seminal were his Harvard Law 
Review article and his Olmstead dissent, Brandeis focused on privacy 
only episodically during his career,145 a fact that provides further 
confirmation of how diverse and consequential his life was.  
Moreover, Brandeis did not view either right—of privacy or 
speech—as absolute.  Although he struck the balance in favor of both 
rights, his formulations made clear that he weighed them against 
other values nonetheless.  The Fourth Amendment protected 
individuals not against all government searches and seizures but only 
against “unjustifiable intrusion;”146 rights of speech and assembly 
must yield to the government’s need to protect against destruction of, 
or serious injury to, the State.147  In each instance, rights, even those 
given highest value, existed in a social context and must sometimes 
yield to other community interests.   
More importantly, Brandeis saw the “right to be let alone” as 
a right individuals held against society or the government against 
unjustified intrusion.148  Even though Brandeis did not believe society 
 
144 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
145 Richards, supra note 138, at 1311. 
146 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
147 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“But, although the rights of free 
speech and assembly are fundamental, they are not in their nature absolute.  Their exercise is 
subject to restriction, if the particular restriction proposed is required in order to protect the 
state from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic or moral.”). 
148 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The makers of our Constitution 
undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.  They recognized the 
significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.  They knew that 
only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.  
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their 
sensations.  They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone—the most 
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or the state should intrude into private spaces, by force or technology, 
he certainly did not endorse reclusive life.  His example and words 
refute any such conclusion.   
Brandeis’ belief in a right to be let alone was fully consistent 
with a duty to participate in a pluralistic society.  The right to be let 
alone was not designed to allow individuals to “pursue lives of 
private fulfillment,” but to serve the instrumental purpose of helping 
them “develop their abilities and imaginations, to be applied 
creatively to the needs of those around them, free from the deadening 
weight of government or group pressure.”149  Whereas wiretaps in 
Olmstead were a device to detect bootlegging, the same technique 
could be used to eavesdrop on political conversations and become an 
instrument whereby a government or majority could act to chill 
political exchange.  In his dissent in Gilbert v. Minnesota, Brandeis 
had complained of a statute which would preclude teachings that a 
citizen should not engage in war during the privacy of a family 
conversation in the home.150  Technology, like statutory prohibitions, 
could suppress discussion.  In some respects, wiretaps, being less 
conspicuous and accordingly less accountable, presented the graver 
threat.  As Neil Richards has written, Brandeis believed “ideas need 
space to incubate and develop, and that privacy protections for 
thoughts and new ideas are essential to meaningful debate and 
discussion.”151 
There is another aspect in which recognition of an expansive 
right of privacy serves, rather than inhibits, an interactive society.  
Although Brandeis did not articulate such a connection, one of his 
wisest law clerks and one who best understood his thought, Paul A. 
Freund, did.152  In his article, “Privacy: One Concept or Many,” 
Freund suggested the “hypothesis” that privacy “serves an important 
socializing function.  An unwillingness to suffer disclosure of what 
has been discreditable in one’s life, or of one’s most intimate 
 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.  To protect that right, 
every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever 
the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
149 Farber, supra note 130, at 185. 
150 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 335-36 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
151 Richards, supra note 138, at 1347. 
152 See generally Paul A. Freund, Privacy: One Concept or Many, in PRIVACY (J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).  I am grateful to my friend and former professor, 
Charles A. Miller, who a number of years ago first pointed out to me Freund’s unique skill 
as an expositor of Brandeis’ thought and work. 
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thoughts and feelings, reflects an intuitive sense that to share 
everything would jeopardize the sharing of anything.”153  Brandeis 
may have recognized Freund’s profound insight that successful 
interaction depends on mutual recognition of a private sphere.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
History has secured Brandeis’ reputation as a foremost and 
effective champion of individual rights relating to speech, assembly, 
and privacy.  Yet Brandeis was a gifted contextual thinker and his 
work in those pursuits occurred in a context that saw the individual 
not as an isolated being but as a part of a larger society.  His 
commitment was to societal, as well as individual, development and 
he recognized the interdependence of those aspirations.  Individuals 
would best develop in democratic society, and democratic society 
depended on engaged and developed individuals for its sustained 
health. 
Brandeis insisted that individuals had duties as well as rights, 
and that the effective performance of duties of citizenship was 
essential to individual development and societal health.  Society 
could not function effectively if individuals focused only on their 
own self-interest rather than on communal needs.  Individuals could 
not develop fully if their cause was simply themselves rather than 
their community. On the other hand, engaged citizens who took their 
public responsibilities seriously would not only develop but would 
contribute to the functioning of democratic society. 
Brandeis recognized that democratic society was necessarily 
diverse.  Free individuals would develop differently in any case.  The 
reality of American demography, with its composition drawing 
people of different races, nationalities and religions, accentuated its 
inherent diversity.   
Brandeis regarded pluralism as not simply a fact, but as a 
necessity.  American society could only function if citizens interacted 
- if they made an effort to know and understand each other.  Society 
must recognize not simply the rights of diverse people, but also the 
duties each has in order to behave as democratic citizens.  Citizens 
must perform their duties in a pluralistic society so that differences 
 
153 Id. at 195.  
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could be expressed and resolved peacefully and so that public 
decisions would reflect the views and wisdom of the collective body.   
But diversity presented an opportunity as well as a challenge.  
Brandeis believed that understanding, knowledge, growth, and 
wisdom were more likely to come from exposure to difference than 
to convention.  Immigrants from different lands enriched America 
and provided the opportunity to enhance America by contributing to 
its culture.  Citizens from different backgrounds could expand their 
knowledge and understanding by reciprocal interaction.   
Brandeis’ expansive conception of the duty of citizens in a 
pluralistic society was evident in his work as a lawyer, his activity as 
a public citizen, his deep commitment to Zionism, and his work as 
one of the greatest justices on America’s Supreme Court.  He gave 
voice to a deeply entrenched American ideal that has endured, despite 
occasional challenges.  His work and words provide a continuous 
beacon as against those who would free individuals from their social 
responsibilities and against those in modern times and in all times 
who would place walls in America between people of different races, 
religions or nationalities. 
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